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CONFLICT OF LAVJS

January, 1964

Final Examination

Notes: (1) All discussion is to be done in accordance with material read and
discussed in the course in Conflict of LaNS. (2) Total potential credit: one
hundred points.
I. (Flfteen points)

A. Define, according to usage in our course } the following terms:
1. Borrowing statute
2. Characterization
3. Renvoi
4. Qualification statute. (Note: As you will recall, "qualification" is also
used as a synonym of "characterization. II)
5. Domicile
B. Hark "yes" or uno II, as indicated.

Choose the ans't-J'er closest to right, and

do not add explanation.
1. Does the full faith and credit clause of the United states Constitution, and
its enabling legislation, apply equally in terms to the acts and judicial proceedings of sister-states? Yes
No

2. By the older view, can enforcement of the judgment of a sister-state be had
under the full faith and credit clause, if that judgment is for future periodic
alimony payments? Yes
No

3. Will enforcement of the judgment of a sister-state be required under the
full faith and credit clause~ if that judgment is based on an incorrect interpretation of the substantive law of the state where enforcement is sought? Yes
No

4.

Will the otherwise-applicable statute of a sister-state be enforced in a
case involving a cause of action that arose in that state, if that state's courts
have characterized that statute as penal and those of the forum have characterized it as non-penal? Yes
No

5. Is there any essential policy difference between the enforceability of the
judgments of a sister-state under the full faith and credit clause, and the
enforceability, in the courts of this country, of the judgments of the courts of
foreign countries? Yes
No

6. Is a statute of limitations usually characterized as substantive, if that
statute stands alone?

Yes

No

7. Does the law of the decedent's domicile at the tLme of making of his will
govern the prooate and administration of his estate under that will, although
he died domiciled in another jurisdiction? Yes
No
8. Does the law of the state of incorporation govern the amenability of a corporation to suit by a rival business in another jurisdiction? Yes
No
9. Maya qualification statute be applied to a foreign corporation that is engaged
to any important extent in doing business in interstate commerce in the enacting
state? Yes
No
10. Is Renvoi a Euronean doctrine of conflict of laws, with almost no current application in this cou~try? Yes
No
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('I1>Tenty p Oints)

Give a simple hypothetical fact situation ~ patterned on the one discussed by
us the other day in connection with an actual case , demonstrating and explaining
the sort of triple characterizat ion problem t hat may now arise in the United
states.

A.

B.

Dis{ :J.ss briefly the following questions:

1. The (a) facotrs involved in determining domicile , and (b) importance of
determining domicile, in cases where domicile is a f actor.
2. How has the doctrine of Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins affected characterization technique?
-

3. To what conflicts situation has the bor rowing statute been made applicable, and why?

4.

\~hat

is the simple, basic, reason of legal policy for the law of conflict

of laws?

5. Compare the "local law" theory of choice of law with the "vested rightsll
theory.

Which important United States judge of recent memory has supported each?
III

(Twenty points)

Discuss briefly (indicating facts , holding, and your opinion of, inter alia,
the significance) ~ of the following cases:
Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co.
Huntington v . Attrill
Hughes v. Fet ter
Sampson v. Channell
Marvin Safe Co. v. Norton
Louis-Dreyfus v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd.
IV (Ten points)
Defendant, "Nad Nan Moe - Est. 1920 , " was a used-car dealer in Detroit,
Michigan. He bought a 164 Thunderbird from Reginald Clarence ("Shady") Tree,
giving in exchange an old Jeep and cash -- Tree representing that.he needed
this for a mining stake. Tree told Moe that he had bought the lB~rd for cash
from a dealer in New Jersey, and that it was free from liens. In fact, the car
was mortgaged in New Jersey to P, who sues here to replevy the car from D, under
the New Jersey recorded mortgage lien.
D had had no actual notice of the existence of this mortgage, nor had he
really had much chance to find out about it; for, although the car ~d New
Jersey plates the mortgage lien did not appear on the face of the t~tle and
D bought befo~e he had had much chance to do any checking in New Jersey.
Who should win, and why? Discuss.
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V. (Twenty p oints)
. Jim and Bill, Minnesota residents, celebrat ed Nel-v Yeart s Eve by heavy drinking
in .,various ~inneapoli~ b?-rs:, , ending up at "Chez Elite", owned and operated by
D Hotel Chaln (an Illlnols corporation doing business in Illinois Wisconsin and
Minnesota)~ Despite their obvious intoxication, they persuaded the bartende; to
sell and serve them lIone for the road." After adding this fuel to all of the
rest, they left for Chicago, Ill. in Jim's car, l~th Jim driving. While driving
~n ~isconsin , Jim drove off the road into a stone wall, killing both passengers
lns~antly.
There were no witnesses, but no circumstances existed to indicate
that the accident was caused otherwise than by Jim's intoxication.
Minnesota has a IIDram Shop Act,1! which provides that:
"No intoxicating liquor shall be sold to any person obviously intoxicated.
Every person who is injured in person or property by any intoxicated person, or
by reason of the intoxication of any person } has a right of action , in his or
her own name, for all damages sustained, aga:Lnst any person who by illegally
selling or giving intoxicating liquor caused or contributed to the intoxication
of such person. I!
Illinois has a similar statute. Wisconsin has no such statute.
Minnesota, 1tJisconsin and Illinois all have wrongful death statutes of the
usual type, those of Hisconsin and Illinois being unlimited in amount while that
of Minnesota limits the maximum recovery to $10 , 000.
Minnesota common law places on plaintiff the burden of proving freedom from
contributory negligence, but Hisconsin and Illinois place on defendant the burden
of proving contributory negligence.
P, entitled under the wrongful death acts as v-lidovl and sold dependent of
Bill, brought an action in the Illinois court a gainst D Hotel Chain. The trial
court gave judgment for P for $100,000, based on a jury verdict, applying the
Minnesota "Dram Shop Statute", because the court believed this was the proper law
to govern the tort and was required by the full faith and credit clause of the
United States Constitution. It held the Minnesota 1m.. inapplicable on the
amount of damages. Despite Dts contention that Bill had been contributorily
negligent, the trial judge instructed the jury that Illinois law applied on
burden of proof of contributory negligence; the jury f ound specially that there
was no evidence concerning contributory negligence , one way or the other.
D appeals to the Illinois Court of Appeals. What arguments should be made
for D on the conflict of laws issues involved in this appeal? How should they
be decided? What arguments would you, as counsel for P, make?
VI.. (Fifteen points)
Mary, who was in business in Massachusetts as a beautician, suffered personal
injuries in that state through her use of one of the products of D, Tony, Inc.,
a Connecticut corporation. The injury occurred on l'1 ay 31 , 1962) and P sued in
Connecticut to rec~ef damages in an action co~~enced ~n Aug. 1, 1963. The theory
of the action was/tn~ injuries were due to negllgence ln the manufacture of the
product that caused the injury.
While the period within which personal injury actions may be brought is one
year in Connecticut the IvIassachusetts law provides that "action of tort and
actions of contract'to recover for personal injuries shall be commenced only
within two years next after the cause of action accrues.1! Discuss how the case
should be decided.
. _
?
Also, as Plaintiff, for what additional fact mlght you seek rather urgently.

